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In the eighteen years since the Supreme Court began to desegregate
the public schools, no aspect of that painful and complex process has
troubled the Court and the country more than the crucial question
Brown v. Board of Education1 posed but failed to resolve: to what
lengths must a once segregated school district go to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Equal Protection Clause? In 1971, the Court reached
at least a new interim answer in Swann v. Charlotte-Mechlenburg:
desegregation plans must achieve the "greatest possible degree of ac-
tual desegregation." 2 To reach that goal, a district court may-and
in Charlotte-Mecklen burg had no alternative but to-order students
transported to schools far from their homes, although not so far "as
to either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on
the educational process." 3
In reaching its answer, the Court looked principally to its own
prior decisions and to the experience of lower federal courts in grap-
pling with the "flinty, intractable realities" 4 of desegregation. The
four Presidents and nine Congresses since Brown had largely left this
task to the Court.; But within a year of Swann, the President and
Congress became leading participants when President Nixon sent to
the House of Representatives two proposals, the Equal Educational
* The author wishes to thank Professor Alexander M. Bickel for his assistance in the
preparation of this Note.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
3. Id. at 30-31.
4. Id. at 6.
5. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1970), indicated some
early congressional displeasure with the prospect of busing to achieve desegregation:
Nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the United States to issue any
order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the tmnsporta-
tion of pupils or students from one school to another or one school district to
another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge the existing
power of the court to insure compliance with constitutional standards.
In Swann, the Court read this provision of Title IV as a congressional attempt to Insure
that the Civil Rights Act did not precipitate an onslaught on de facto segregation, not
as an attempt to restrict the Court in remedying de jure segregation. 402 U.S. at 16.18.
The Court's interpretation of the provision suggests, at the very least, that It is ex-
tremely reluctant to interpret any legislation as a restriction on the federal courts'
power to enter busing orders.
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Opportunities Act6 and the Student Transportation Moratorium Act,7
designed to "place firm and effective curbs on busing."s Should the
President's bills, or legislation like them, become law, the Court would
face for the first time a forceful and direct challenge to its direction
and authority in the school desegregation area.
Much of the Equal Educational Opportunities Bill would not
trouble a court trying to apply both the bill and Swann's doctrine.
In an effort to achieve equal educational opportunity without sac-
rificing the neighborhood school, the bill directs federal officials to
concentrate school aid on schools in low-income areas," and it permits
both the Attorney General and private citizens to sue to remedy de-
nials of equal protection in the schools, which are defined in much
the same way the federal courts have.10 Most of the bill's restrictions
on federal courts can be reconciled with Swam, because they do not
prevent a court from resorting to a particular remedy. Busing ranks
last on the bill's priority schedule of remedies," but Swann never
6. H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Equal Educational Op-
portunities Bill]. Sponsored by Representatives McCulloch, Quie and Ford, the bill was
passed in revised form by the House of Representatives August 18, 1972, and sent to
the Senate, where it bypassed committee and went directly on to the Senate Calendar.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1972, at 9, col. 1. When the third attempt to end a filibuster against
the bill failed, the Senate voted on October 12, 1972 to drop the bill for this )ear. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 8.
7. H.R. 13916, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Moratorium Bill].
Sponsored by Representatives McCulloch and Ford, the bill has yet to be acted upon.
On June 23, 1972, President Nixon signed the Education Amendments of 1972, P.L.
92-318, 86 Stat. 235, which in § 803 delayed implementing federal court orders requiring
transportation "for the purposes of achieving a balance among the students with re-
spect to race" until all appeals in the case have been exhausted or until January 1, 1974.
Reluctantly accepted by both the House and the President, this version of the section
nonetheless seems to have greatly lessened the Moratorium Bill's chance for passage.
Since this amendment became law, Justice Powell, sitting in his capacity as Circuit
Justice for the Fifth Circuit, has refused to stay implementation of an Augusta, Georgia
busing order, and Justice Rehnquist has denied similar stays to Nashville and Oklahoma
City. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1972, at 23, col. 1. Recently, Justice Douglas denied a motion
for a stay involving the Las Vegas school system. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1972, at 35, col. 1.
8. Message. From the President of the United States Relative to Busing and Equality
of Educational Opportunity, and Transmitting a Draft of Proposed Legislation to Impose
a Moratorium on New and Additional Student Transportation, H.R. Doc. No. 92.-195,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Message], 15.
9. Equal Educational Opportunities Bill, § 101(a).
10. Equal Educational Opportunities Bill, § 201. §§ 202 and 203 of the Bill provide,
however, that absent a purpose to segregate neither the failure to attain a racial balance
nor assignment of pupils to neighborhood schools shall be considered a denial of
equal educational opportunity. § 301 grants the right to sue to an), individual "denied
an equal educational opportunity" and to the Attorney General. § 802 gives jurisdiction
over such suits to the "appropriate district court of the United States." § 303 provides
for intervention by the Attorney General in private.party suits.
11. § 402 of the Equal Educational Opportunities Bill provides:
Sec. 402. In formulating a remedy for a denial of equal educational opportunity
or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, which may involve directly or in-
directly the transportation of students, a court, department or agency of the United
States shall consider and ma'e specific findings on the efficacy in correcting such
denial of the following remedies and shall require implementation of the first of
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suggested that busing was a favored remedy. And the district court
in Swann had made precisely the finding that must precede increased
busing in the upper grades under the bill: that no other method
will provide an adequate remedy.
12
The bill's central provision, however, cuts against Swann. It pre-
vents any federal court or federal agency from implementing a de-
segregation plan for elementary students (students in the sixth and
lower grades) that would increase "either the average daily distance
to be traveled by, or the average daily time of travel" for the students
or "the average daily number of students ... transported by an edu-
cational agency over the comparable averages for the preceding school
year."' 3 In some cases, the Swann standard may be met without re-
the remedies set out below, or in the first combination thereof, which would remedy
such denial:
(a) assigning students to the schools closest to their places of residence which
provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students,
taking into account school capacities and natural physical barriers;
(b) assigning students to the schools closest to their place of residence which
provide the appropriate grade level and type of education for such students,taking into account only school capacities;
(c) permitting students to transfer from a school in which a majority of the
students are of their race, color, or national origin to a school iii which aminori y of the s udents are of their race, color, or a ion l origino
(d) the creation or revision of attendance zones or grade structures without
exceeding the transportation limits set forth in section 403;( ) the construction of new schools or the closing f inferior schools;
(t) the construction or establishment of magnet schools or educational parks; or(g) the development and implementation of any other plan which is educa-
tionally sound and administratiely feasible, subject to the provisions of sections
403 and 404 of this Act.
12. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971).
13. § 403 of the Equal Educational Opportunities Bill, crucial to this discussion,
provides in full:
TRANSPORTATION OF STUDENTS
Sec. 403. (a) No court, department, or agency of the United States shall, pursuant
to section 402. order the implementation of a plan that would require an increase
for any school year in-(1) either the average daily distance to be traveled by, or the average daily
time of travel for, all students in the sixth grade or below transported by aneducational agency over the comparable averages for the preceding school year; or
(2) the average daily number of students in the sixth grade or below trans-
ported by an educational agency over the comparable average for the precedingschool year, disregarding the transportation of any student which results from
a change in such student's residence, his advancement to a higher level of edu-
cation, or his attendance at a school operated by an educational agency for the
first time.(b) No court, department, or agency of the United States shall, pursuant to
section 402, order the implementation of a plan which would require an Increase
for any school year in-
(1) either the average daily distance to be traveled by, or the average daily
time of travel for, all students in the seventh grade or above transported by
an educational agency over the comparable averages for the preceding school
year; or(2) the average daily number of students in the seventh grade or above trans- .
ported by an educational agency over the comparable average for the preceding
school year, disregarding the transportation of any student which results from
1544
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quiring increased busing, but in the circumstances of Swanm, and
presumably in other cases, no other method would have achieved a
degree of desegregation sufficient to satisfy the Equal Protection
Clause. In the district court's plan, busing was a constitutionally nec-
essary remedy. Yet the Supreme Court would have violated the Equal
Educational Opportunities Bill 14 in approving it.
The Student Transportation Moratorium Bill has a much less
enduring purpose, and its provisions are much simpler.,; The bill
would give Congress, and the school districts under court order, a
breathing spell while more comprehensive legislation is being con-
sidered.' 6 It stays all federal court orders that require new busing of
any student, or that require any student to be bused to a school
other than the one he is currently attending, until July 1, 1973, or
until the Congress enacts the kind of plan embodied in the Equal
Educational Opportunities Bill.17 Had the moratorium been in force
a change in such student's residence, his advancement to a higher level of edu-
cation, or his attendance at a school operated by an educational agency for
the first time,
unless it is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that no other method
set out in section 402 will provide an adequate remedy for the denial of equal
educational opportunity or equal protection of the laws that has been found by
such court, department, or agency. The implementation of a plan calling for in-
creased transportation, as described in clause (1) or (2) of this subsection, shall
be deemed a temporary measure. In any event such plan shall be subject to the
limitation of section 407 of this Act and shall only be ordered in conjunction with
the development of a long term plan involving one or more of the remedies set out
in clauses (a) through (g) of section 402. If a United States district court orders
implementation of a plan requiring an increase in transportation, as described in
clause (1) or (2) of this subsection, the appropriate court of appeals shall, upon
timely application by a defendant educational agency, grant a stay of such order
until it has reviewed such order.
(c) No court, department, or agency of the United States shall require directly
or indirectly the transportation of any student if such transportation poses a risk
to the health of such student or constitutes a significant impingement on the edu-
cational process with respect to such student.
As passed by the House, the bill prevents a court front entering an order requiring an
elementary student to attend any school but the one closest or next closest to his home.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1972, at 9, col. 1.
14. The plan at issue in Swann required the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district
to purchase 138 more buses. 402 U.S. at 30, n.12. If more buses mean more students
being bused, the Court's plan would have run afoul of the Equal Educational Oppor-
tunities Bill's § 403(a)(2).
15. Because this bill's provisions depend for their constitutionality on the same
issue its companion bill raises-congressional power to restrict the scope of remedies
open to federal courts in entering desegregation decrees-it will not be discussed sepa-
rately. If Congress has the power permanently to stop courts from entering certain
busing orders, surely it has the power to do so temporarily. See Professor Robert Bork's
more detailed treatment of this point in his defense of the busing bills, Bork, Consti.
tutionality of the President's Busing Proposals (American Enterprise Institute, 1972),
17-19, see also Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 US. 398 (1934); Bickel,
What's Wrong with Nixon's Busing Bills?, NEw REPUBLiC, Apr. 22, 1972, at 19, 20.
16. Moratorium Bill, § 2(b).
17. § 3(a) of the Moratorium Bill stays any federal order "to the extent it requires,
directly or indirectly, a local educational agency
(1) to transport a student who was not being transported by such local educational
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when Swann was decided, it would have completely prevented the
implementation of the district court's plan, although it would have
done so for only a short time.
Should another case like Swann-a hypothetical "Swann 11"-arise
with these bills in force, the Court would be compelled to accept or
reject their assertion of congressional authority in an area that until
now has been occupied exclusively and powerfully by the judiciary.
In his message to Congress, the President suggested that Congress has
power under the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to enact his bills.' s Other proponents of the Administration plan
have argued that Article III, with its grant to Congress of power over
federal jurisdiction, settles whatever constitutional problems the bus-
ing bills create.19 Either of these claims to congressional power, heard
in full and accepted by a court reconsidering Swann, not only would
profoundly alter the present prospects for school desegregation but
might also redefine the basic and enduring outlines of the Supreme
Court's role in shaping the law.
I. Article III: Jurisdiction and Remedies
Any court reconsidering Swann would face the Article III argument
as a threshold question: does the congressional power over jurisdiction
encompass the strict prohibitions of the busing bills? The bills, of
course, are not now phrased in jurisdictional terms, and the court
might avoid any inquiry relating to Article III by noting that Congress
did not make explicit its reliance on its power over jurisdiction. Re-
casting them to refer explicitly to Article III would require some skill
in drafting, lest they open unforeseen jurisdictional gaps, and the
bills would read much more awkwardly as a result.20 But no real
distinction can be drawn between a bill that begins "No court shall
enter an order that . . ." and one that reads "No court shall have
jurisdiction to enter an order that . . . ." A court searching for con-
stitutional support for the Nixon busing plan should look to substance,
not form, and therefore should turn first to Article III.
agency immediately prior to the entry of such order; or
(2) to transport a student to or from a school to which or from which such student
was not being transported by such local educational agency immediately prior to
the entry of such order."
18. Message 2.
19. Acting Attorney General Kleindeinst took this position the day after the President
outlined his busing proposals on national television. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1972, at 1,
col. 8. Columnist William F. Buckley, Jr. came to the same conclusion in a column
entitled "Curb the Courts?" New Haven Journal-Courier, May 4, 1972, at 11, col. 1.
20. For a discussion of such possible redrafting, see Bork, supra note 15, at 6.
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Section 1 of Article III vests the "judicial Power of the United
States" in "one supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 21 Section 2
of Article III grants the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
certain classes of cases, "with such Exceptions, and under such Regu-
lations as the Congress shall make."22 If Congress creates inferior
federal courts and confers jurisdiction on them, surely it can remove
jurisdiction. The busing bills-so the argument runs-amount to an
exercise of congressional power over federal jurisdiction, depriving
courts of the power to enter certain kinds of busing orders. But in
cases arising under both Section 1 and Section 2 of Article III, the
Supreme Court has indicated that Congress may not, in the guise of
exercising power over jurisdiction, enact legislation it could not enact
under some other grant of power. The power over jurisdiction is just
that: a power to grant or withhold jurisdiction, not a disguised power
to revise the Court's reading of the Constitution.
A. Section 1: Power Over Inferior Courts
A court reconsidering Swann in light of the Busing Acts would
turn to the Norris-LaGuardia Act -3 and the Emergency Price Control
Act of 194224 as the modern statutory precedents in which Congress
read its Article III mandate most broadly. In neither instance, how-
ever, did Congress assert a power to regulate the jurisdiction of lower
courts as sweepingly as it would by enacting the busing bills.
Proponents of the 1932 Norris-LaGuardia Act, including the House
and Senate Committees, advanced the same kind of claims to Article
III power as those a court would face in trying to apply the Busing
Acts to a second Swann case.2 5 The Act's authors phrased it in juris-
dictional terms in an attempt to skirt constitutional problems by
explicitly invoking Article III. Titled "AN ACT to amend the Ju-
dicial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sitting
in equity, and for other purposes," it removed the jurisdiction of
21. Article I Section 8 grants Congress the concomitant power to "constitute tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court."
22. The Supreme Court has read these clauses to give Congress a vcry broad power
indeed: "Courts created by statute have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers."
Sheldon v. Sill, 49 US. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850). See also Kline v. Burke Construction
Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1867); Gary v. Curtis,
44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
23. 29 US.C. §§ 101-15 (1970).
24. Act of January 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
25. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1932), S. REP'. No. 163, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
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federal courts to issue an injunction in labor disputes except in
extreme circumstances.2 6 Felix Frankfurter, then professor of law at
Harvard and a principal draftsman of the bill, examined the Article
III cases in a brief appendix to the House Report and concluded that
the principal limit on congressional power grew out of the separation
6f powers doctrine.2 7 "For Congress itself to hesitate" to pass the
Act on constitutional grounds, he wrote, "would seem to be a para-
doxical act of self-abnegation." 2s
Six years after the Norris-LaGuardia Act became law, the Supreme
Court in Lauf v. E.G. Shinner F, Co. disposed of the constitutional
objections to the Act in one sentence: "There can be no question,"
the Court said, "of the power of Congress thus to define and limit
the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States. -"
Truax v. Corrigan,3 ° decided nine years before the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was passed, seemed to give the labor injunction the status of a
constitutional right. If the Congress in passing the Act and the Court
in considering it read Truax this way, the Act would be even more
forceful precedent for the busing bills. The Court in Truax found
that a state statute prohibiting injunctions for certain acts in a labor
dispute violated both the Equal Protection and the Due Process Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Since both Truax and Lauf dealt with
statutory limitations on a court's injunctive powers, together they
might be read to say that Congress, because it has Article III powers,
may violate the Due Process Clause-while the states, which lack such
a power over federal jurisdiction, may not.
But the Truax majority did not announce a constitutional right
to a labor injunction. The Court thought that the state statute granted
"complete immunity from any civil or criminal action to the de-
fendants," 31 thus preventing an employer from obtaining any remedy.
The Court in Truax read the state statute as removing all remedies,
not just injunctions; the Norris-LaGuardia Act affected only injunc-
tions and so arguably did not run afoul of the Truax doctrine. And
it could be, of course, that the Court in Lauf simply changed its mind
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 107.
27. Frankfurter, Power of Congress Over Equity Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
H.R. REP. No. 669, supra note 25, at 12-16.
28. Id. at 16.
29. 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938).
30. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
31. Id. at 328. Frankfurter, too, argued for this reading of the case: "Certainly the
Truax case did not maintain that withdrawal of injunctive relief alone denied due
process of law." Frankfurter & Greene, Congressional Power over the Labor Injunction,
31 COLUM. L. REV. 385, 408 (1931).
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when pressed by Congress. If an employer had been granted a "consti-
tutional right" to a labor injunction under Truax, it may have been
abandoned by the Court, like other ill-fated doctrines, with the wane
of substantive due process. Lauf provides no clue as to which inter-
pretation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act the Court favored.
Nor did the Norris-LaGuardia Act go quite so far as the busing
bills in its attempts to end the excesses of federal courts. As Professor
Frankfurter himself acknowledged, the Norris-LaGuardia Act accord-
ed only limited immunity: "it is not immunity from legal as distin-
guished from equitable remedies-hitherto unlawful conduct remains
unlawful; ... .,"32 He noted too that the Act limited only the power
to enjoin: "all other remedies in federal courts and all remedies in
state courts remain open."33 The Norris-LaGuardia Act reflected a
congressional choice of remedy, foreclosing one remedy in some cir-
cumstances, but leaving others open in all circumstances. The Act
provides no support for the busing bills unless they, like it, foreclose
only one of several remedies.
Moreover, federal courts issued injunctions in labor disputes to
remedy violations of the common law or a particular statute, such as
the Sherman Act with its prohibition on "restraints of trade."34 None
of these wrongs were direct violations of the Constitution, and to
the extent that the union's crimes originated in statutes or the common
law, Congress could redefine them. In the cases the Norris-LaGuardia
Act addressed, Congress and not the Constitution controlled the rights
whose violation triggered the federal jurisdiction. But in desegrega-
tion cases the Constitution does bring federal equity power into play.
Insofar as the Constitution requires the courts to remedy state denials
of equal protection, congressional curbs on the scope of remedies avail-
able to the courts must rest on different constitutional ground than
did the Norris-LaGuardia Act. A court deciding Swan II must there-
fore look to different precedent.
Ten years after passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Congress again
invoked Article III in adopting the Emergency Price Control Act.33
In its attempt to facilitate wartime price control, Congress raised con-
32. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, TnE LABOR INIJUNCION 215 (19SO).
33. Id. at 220. Justice Frankfurter took precisely the opposite position writing for
the majority in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), without acknowledging
the Professor's earlier views.
34. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, TIlE LABOR INJUNCTION, Supra note 31, at 5-17.
35. Act of January 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23. For a complete outline of the Act's
provisions, see H.R. REP. No. 1409, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); see also Reid & Hatton,
Price Control and National Defense, 36 ILL. L. REv. 255 (1942); Note, Administralte
Features of the Emergency Price Control Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 991 (1942).
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stitutional issues much like those raised by the busing bills, and cer-
tainly as serious. The Act's jurisdictional provisions, similar in
many respects to the more modest 1971 price control legislation,"
removed the jurisdiction of federal district and state courts to con-
sider the validity, under the Act or the Constitution, of the regula-
tions promulgated by the Price Administrator, and it stripped them
of power to enjoin the enforcement of any set of regulations. Instead,
the Act granted an Emergency Court of Appeals and (on appeal
from its judgments) the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to set
aside price regulations. 38 The Act also limited the time for contesting
a regulation's validity.3 9 The Emergency Court could set aside a regu-
lation only on final judgment; it could not issue a temporary restrain-
ing order or interlocutory decree.40 And the Act postponed the effect
of even a final decree of invalidity pending expeditious review in
the Supreme Court.
41
The Act's proponents thought that Article III gave Congress power
thus to regulate the jurisdiction of inferior federal courts, 42 and in
Lockerty v. Phillips,43 decided in 1943, the Supreme Court agreed with
part of their theory. The Court used broad language in holding that
a district court could not set aside, even on constitutional grounds,
a regulation. The Constitution "left Congress free t6 establish in-
36. The Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971 duplicate the 1942 Act's
provisions in some respects in § 211. Pub. L. No. 92-210 (December 22, 1971). The Act
vests exclusive jurisdiction over price control appeals in a Temporary Emergency Court
of Appeals just as the Emergency Price Control Act did. Id. at § 211(b). The Emergency
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of any regula.
tion or order (id. at § 211(g); constitutional defenses may be raised in a district court
enforcement proceeding, but they are to be certified to the Emergency Court. Id. at
§ 211(c). A district court thus may set regulations aside as invalid under the statute,
but it may not set any regulation aside as invalid under the Constitution. Id. at §§
211(d), (e). Regulations may be set aside only on final judgment, and an appeal auto-
matically stays the effect of a final judgment of invalidity. Id. at §§ 211(e), (t)
37. Act of January 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 204(d), 56 Stat. 23.
38. Id.
39. Id. at §§ 203(a), 204(a). An aggrieved individual had to file objections to a regula.
tion with the Administrator within sixty days of its issuance; after the Administrator's
decision, an appeal could be taken to the Emergency Court of Appeals within thirty days.
40. Id. at § 204(c).
41. Id. at § 204(b). ,,
42. The Administrator of the OPA argued in the House hearings that there cam
be no question of the constitutional power of Congress to vest in the emergency court
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of ceiling regulations and orders"; Ile
cited Lauf for the proposition that "Congress may define, limit, or entirely withdraw
the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions in particular classes of cases." Hear.
ings on H.R. 5479 (superseded by H.R. 5990) Before the House Comm. on Banhing and
Currency, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 336 (1941). See also id. at 63.87; Nathanson, The Emner.
gency Price Control Act of 1942: Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review, 9 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 60 (1942); Comment, Judicial Review of Price Orders under the
Emergency Price Control Act, 37 ILL. L. REV. 256 (1942).
43. 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
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ferior federal courts or not as it thought appropriate," and Congress
could remove certain kinds of cases from their jurisdiction. 44 The
Court noted carefully, however, that the Act did permit constitutional
challenge in the Emergency Court since "a conitruction of the statute
which would deny all opportunity for judicial determination of an
asserted constitutional right is not to be favored." 43 Lockerty may be
read to say merely that the Price Control Act, like the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, removed one remedy while substituting another.
In Lockerty, where plaintiffs had simply challenged a set of regu-
lations, the constitutional debate was limited and slightly abstract.
But in Yakus v. United States,40 decided the same year, the Court
faced a stark due process issue. An enforcement court, in convicting
Yakus, refused even to question the constitutionality of the regulations
involved, and it denied him a stay of enforcement pending appeal.
In affirming the convictions, the Supreme Court clarified the scope
and limits of Article III power.
Answering defendants' contention that prohibiting issuance of stay
orders during a challenge in the Emergency Court denied them due
process of law, the Court noted that "the award of an interlocutory
injunction by courts of equity has never been regarded as strictly a
matter of right."47 When public, as opposed to purely private, inter-
ests will be affected by a stay order, the Court argued, a district judge
must himself balance the potential damage to the public interest
against the potential damage to a private party. Here Congress had
done the balancing in price control cases and the Court would abide
by its conclusion.48 Advocates of the busing bill would argue that a
court must for the same reason abide by the congressional judgment
about busing orders.
Petitioners in Yakus argued also that the Act denied them due
process of law by removing the enforcement court's jurisdiction to ex-
amine the validity of the very regulations it had enforced. But the
Court refused to look at a district court enforcement proceeding
44. Id. at 187.
45. Id. at 188.
46. 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
47. Id. at 440.
48. Id. at 44142. OPA Administrator Henderson made the same argument in the
House hearings: "These provisions merely crystallize the well-cstablished equitable
doctrine that equity courts will not issue preliminary injunctions where the public
interest would suffer irreparable injury." Hearings, supra note 42, at 340. The Court
had used this kind of reasoning in upholding congressional power under Article 111
to prevent federal courts from enjoining state proceedings in certain cases. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,
260 U.S. 226 (1922).
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apart from the overall statutory scheme. The statute gave those subject
to it one opportunity to litigate all issues, including the validity of
newly issued regulations, and the Constitution required no more. The
statutory scheme for allocating issues among different courts must
provide an accused with "an adequate opportunity to be heard on
the question of validity,"49 but petitioners in Yakus made no showing
that they had lacked such an opportunity.
For a court reconsidering Swann in light of the busing bills, the price
control cases seem to be forceful precedent; they suggest that Con-
gress may remove a district court's power even to hear a defendant's
claim that he has been denied due process of law. But the Emer-
gency Price Control Act granted to another federal court the same
jurisdiction it removed from district courts. Unless it is only a per-
functory provision, Article III must empower Congress to allocate
"cases and controversies" among courts of discrete jurisdiction in
this fashion. The busing bills do not transfer jurisdiction, they di-
vest federal courts of the power to enter certain busing orders; the
Price Control Act is thus a poor analogy to them. Congress may take
away a federal court's power to hear constitutional claims-but only
if it gives the same power to other federal courts. Article III, the
Yakus Court thought, would not support the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act "if by statutory command or in operation it will deny,
to those charged with violations, an adequate opportunity to be
heard on the question of validity." °
Dealing with these cases in his landmark discussion of congressional
power over inferior courts.51 Professor Hart rejected an argument
that would bring the busing bills within Article III. Congressional
power over jurisdictions is subject "in whole not in part" to "the other
provisions of the Constitution," and it does not amount to an un-
limited power to affect constitutional rights:
49. 321 U.S. at 446.
50. 321 U.S. at 446. In Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), the Court reached
a result consistent with this analysis in considering the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (Act of March 4, 1927, ci. 509, 44 Stat. 1424). Although
Congress may preclude district courts from conducting a de novo hearing into facts
established by an administrative tribunal, it may not preclude full enquiry Into those
facts that establish the tribunal's jurisdiction; "the essential independence of the
exercise of the judicial power of the United States in the enforcement of constitutional
rights requires that the Federal court should determine such an issue upon Its own
record and the facts elicited before it." 285 U.S. at 64. The "jurisdictional facts" doctrine
is now in some disrepute (see 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $ 38.0812], at 52 (2d ed. 1971)),
but even Brandeis in dissent agreed with the proposition that in "certain circumstances,
the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial process," 285
U.S. at 87.
51. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise In Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).
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Why, what monstrous illogic! To build up a mere power to
regulate jurisdiction into a power to affect rights having nothing
to do with jurisdiction! And into a power to do it in contradic-
tion to all the other terms of the very document which confers
the power to regulate jurisdiction!52
Both the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Emergency Price Control
Act, although they assert as strongly as any modern legislation a claim
to broad power under Article III, remain consistent with Professor
Hart's analysis. The busing bills do more:
1. They remove the jurisdiction of all federal courts to enter cer-
tain kinds of desegregation decrees; Yakus and Lockerty found in Ar-
ticle III only the power to allocate jurisdiction, not to remove it.
2. They restrict federal courts in remedying constitutional wrongs;
the Norris-LaGuardia Act limited equity power in cases of statutory
or common law origin.
3. They remove, at least in part, one remedy for a state's denial of
equal protection; to the extent that this remedy is the only remedy,
the Norris-LaGuardia Act is poor precedent for them.
As an exercise in regulating jurisdiction, the busing bills can find
little constitutional support in even the strongest congressional claims
to Article III power over inferior federal courts. The bills attempt
to alter substantially not just the manner but the extent to which
constitutional rights may be vindicated, and Section 1 of Article III
gives Congress no such power.
B. Section 2: Power Over the Supreme Court
Section 1 of Article III gives Congress power over only inferior fed-
eral courts; to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the busing
bills must turn to Section 2. The bills do not by their terms address
the state courts, and presumably these courts would be free to enter
busing orders without regard to the restrictions on federal courts. 
3
52. Id. at 1371. Not only is the congressional power over jurisdiction subject "in
whole not in part" to "the other provisions of the Constitution," but it is only a
power over jurisdiction, a power to determine what courts shall hear and decide a
class of cases rather than a power to influence the nature of the decision in a manner
inconsistent with the Constitution. Although Hart ar es that "it's hard, for n at
least, to read into Article III any guarantee to a civil litigant of a hearing in a federal
constitutional court .... - nonetheless if "Congress directs an Article III court to de-
cide a case, I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress
to tell the Court how to decide it." Id. at 1372-73. And, Hart argues, Congress may not
even be able to withdraw a class of cases from the federal jurisdiction where the con-
stitutional scheme requires that federal courts decide that kind of case, as in federal
habeas corpus cases. Cf. note 68 infra. Certainly, he argues, Congress cannot direct the
Court to ignore the due process clause in considering a petition. Id. at 1393.
53. Both bills leave state courts and state agencies free to ignore the restrictions on
busing. Moratorium Bill § 3(c); Equal Educational Opportunities Bill § 405.
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Certainly state courts must enforce the Fourteenth Amendment no
less zealously than federal courts; though they have not been the
chief instruments of desegregation, the state courts have played a
role too.54 The busing bills would, however, limit the role of the
Supreme Court on appeal from such state judgments under all but
the most disingenuous reading of the bills' provisions.)' If Article
III provides constitutional support for the bills as they affect the Su-
preme Court, it is because the bills are "exceptions" to or "regula-
tions" of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Article III power over the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
reached its high-water mark a century ago in Ex parte McCardlc.50
Congress succeeded, or so it seemed, in doing much more than the
busing bills try to do: it stripped the Supreme Court of power to de-
cide a class of sensitive cases, including a case in which the Court
had already heard argument. A court trying to reconcile Svann 11
with the Busing Act's limitations on the Supreme Court would turn
to McCardle to find the outer limits of congressional power under
Section 2 of Article III.
McCardle, a Mississippi newspaper editor arrested and imprisoned
awaiting trial by the military command, brought and lost a habeas
corpus petition in the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Mis-
sissippi. He used an 1867 procedural statute to appeal his convic-
tion to the Supreme Court."1 McCardle was a civilian, and Congress
feared that the Court would declare the Reconstruction Acts uncon-
stitutional in granting his petition. 8 So Congress repealed the 1867
appeals act in the midst of argument before the Court.5
The Court held unanimously that Congress had the power under
54. See, e.g., Morton v. City Commissioners of Parsons, 178 Kan. 282, 285 P.2d 774
(1955); Moorman v. Morgan, 285 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955); Vetere v. Allen, 15
N.Y.2d 259, 258 N.Y.S.2d 77, 206 N.E.2d 174, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 825 (1965); Addabbo
v. Donovan, 22 A.D.2d 383, 256 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't), af 'd, 16 N.Y.2d 619, 261 N.Y.S.2d
68, 209 N.E.2d 112, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965). See also Note, Racial Imbalance
in the Public Schools: Constitutional Dimensions and Judicial Response, 18 VAND. L.
REv. 1290, n.180, 1319-21 (1965).
55. Since both bills prevent only federal courts from entering the proscribed remedies,
it might be argued that the Court could, consistent with the bills provision, require
state courts to enter orders a federal court could not. The Moratorium Bill seems to
anticipate this sophistry; the Equal Educational Opportunities Bill does not.
56. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). See Levy, Congressional Power Over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: A Reappraisal, 22 N.Y.U. INThA. L. REv. 178 (1967).
57. Act of February 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
58. For a discussion of this whole episode, see 2 C. WARREN, Tim SUPREME CouwT IN
UNImED STATES HIsToRY 455-97 (1928). The Court had twice before refused to rule on
the Reconstruction Acts. In Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 US. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), the
Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a suit to enjoin President Johnson from carrying
out the Acts; in Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867), the Court dismissed
a similar suit against the Secretary of War.
59. Act of March 27, 1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44.
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Article III to make exceptions like this one to the appellate jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court. The Court faced an express repeal of an
authorizing statute, and it could not "imagine a plainer instance of
positive exception."6 ° The Court announced its inability to proceed
and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without further analysis.
Few cases have aroused the Congress as much as McCardle, and
few courts have faced the intense pressure the Chase Court faced in
deciding McCardle. With troops in the streets of the capital and the
President of the United States on trial before the Senate, a less ideal
setting for dispassionate judicial inquiry could hardly be imagined.
Moreover, McCardle's holding and reasoning may not retain what-
ever vitality they once had."' Of course the gravity of the issues in-
volved does not minimize the directness of the decision, and cer-
tainly no court has ever overruled McCardle. But even if McCardle
stands, it does not support claims to unbounded congressional power
under Section 2 of Article III.
A year after McCardle seemed to block all habeas corpus appeals, the
Court decided in a virtually identical case that at least one procedure
for appeal remained open. 2 A Mississippi civilian, arrested by mili-
tary authorities for trial before a military commission, appealed the
circuit court decision denying his petition for habeas corpus. He ig-
nored the now defunct 1867 procedure and invoked the Judiciary
Act of 178903 to ask the Court for an original writ of habeas corpus on
the basis of a record brought up by certiorari. In deciding Ex parle
Yerger,64 an again unanimous Court construed the 1868 repealer to
remove only the procedures for appeal created by the 1867 Act. Yer-
ger's route to the Supreme Court was a tortuous one, but it was clear
that the Court retained jurisdiction of habeas corpus appeals.
McCardle becomes quite a different case when read in light of Yer-
ger, and a less forceful precedent for the court deciding Swann Ir. The
1868 repealer, which McCardle found constitutional, simply removed
one of two equally effective means for obtaining Supreme Court re-
view in habeas corpus cases; like the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the re-
pealer expressed a congressional choice among remedies.-0 McCardle's
language seems to go further, but in view of Yerger it should be
60. 74 US. (7 Wall.) at 514.
61. Dissenting in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), Justice Douglas doubted
that McCardle's holding "could command a majority view today." Id. at 605 n.11.
62. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868).
63. Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82.
64. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).
65. See Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiclion of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rzv. 157, 180 (1960).
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read for "the least it has to be worth" rather than "all it might be
worth." 66 This reading of the case would explain why the Court took
the trouble in McCardle to point out that the repealer did not neces-
sarily deny "the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas
corpus," and to note that the 1868 Act did not remove from the
Court's "jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under
the Act of 1867."67
To the extent that it actually relied upon the rationale later ex-
pressed in Yerger, the McCardle Court never faced a serious constitu-
tional conflict, although clearly it faced the gravest of institutional
conflicts. Indeed, Yerger contains suggestions that, had Congress
eliminated all review of habeas corpus actions, the result even in
McCardle might have been different."" If any implications are to be
drawn from these two cases, one of them must be that there are
substantive limits to the exercise of congressional power under Sec-
tion 2 of Article III. In United States v. Klein,00 decided only three
years after Yerger, the Court found that Congress had passed such
a limit.
An 1863 statute permitted executor Klein to recover property con-
fiscated during the war upon proof that its owner "has never given
any aid or comfort to the present rebellion." 70 Klein's decedent had
been granted an executive pardon in 1864, and the Court's recent
decision that such a pardon erased any rebel taint for a recovery pro-
ceeding evidently precipitated Klein's claim.7' But Congress had an-
swered the Court by removing its jurisdiction to hear cases where
the only proof of innocence was an executive pardon, 2 and the Court
faced this Act for the first time when the Government appealed Klein's
victory. The Court, in affirming the Court of Claims, found the Act
an unconstitutional attempt to "prescribe rules for decision to the
66. Hart, supra note 50, at 1364.
67. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
68. Chief Justice Chase quoted the constitutional prohibition against suspending
the writ in Article I, Section 9, noted the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and
then wrote:
It would have been, indeed, a remarkable anomaly if this court, ordained by the
Constitution for the exercise, in the United States, of the most important powers
in civil cases of all the highest courts of England, had been denied, tinder a Con.
stitution which absolutely prohibits the suspension of the writ, except under cx.
traordinary exigencies, that power in cases of alleged unlawful restraints, whilch
the Habeas Corpus Act of Charles II expressly declares those courts to possess.
75 U.S. at 96. For a more explicit and modern version of this argument, see Elsentrager
v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
69. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
70. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820.
71. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
72. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
1556
Vol. 81: 1542, 1972
The Nixon Busing Bills
Judicial Department ' 73 and to interfere with the executive's power
to pardon.
In Klein, the Court says quite clearly that Article III gives Con-
gress no blank check; a statute denying jurisdiction is not for that
reason alone insulated from judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the Court
held that some denials of jurisdiction conflict with the scheme of the
Constitution. Although it may regulate and make exceptions to the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, the Congress may not remove
certain attributes of judicial power-in Klein, the power to construe
the effect of an executive pardon-under the guise of removing juris-
diction. Although it does not so hold, Klein does suggest that an ap-
peal to Article III will not save a statute inconsistent with other parts
of the Constitution, and it indicates that the Court will protect rights
and powers granted by the Constitution from an Article III attack.
Congress has on other occasions exercised or threatened to exercise
its power under Section 2 of Article III, but in no instance has it done
so as forcefully as it did in McCardle. McCardle would lend support
to the busing bills' restrictions on the Supreme Court if any case
would. Yet, when read with its contemporaries, it does not. The cases
dealing with congressional power over the Supreme Court may, in
fact, cut the other way; some of the scholars who have examined them
argue that Congress may not, in the exercise of its power over the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, impair any of the Court's "essen-
tial constitutional functions."
74
But the court deciding Swann 11 need not wait for the results of the
73. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
74. Ratner, supra note 65, argues strongly for the proposition that congressional
power over the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be used to impair
its "essential constitutional functions": "constitutional limitations arc not transgressed
so long as the Court remains available ultimately to resolve conflicts betwteen state and
federal law by lower courts." Id. at 201. Herbert Wechsler takes issue with Ratner's
standard, arguing "that Congress has the power by enactment of a statute to strike at
what it deems judicial excess by delimitations of the jurisdiction of the lower courts
and of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction." Wechsler, The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (1965). At the same time, though. he recog-
nizes that Article III grants only a power to withdraw jurisdiction and "when I speak
of withdrawal I mean, of course, complete elimination of all cognizance of cases of
the kind. Congress could not, for example, employ federal courts as organs of enforce-
ment and preclude them from attending to the Constitution in arrihing at decision
of the cause." Id. at 1006. He seems to accept Hart's proposition that "jurisdiction is
always jurisdiction only to decide constitutionally." Hart, supra note 50, at 1.02. See
also R. BERGER, Coxc.Ess v. THE SUPRFE COURT (1969). Berger takes a fresh look at
the framers' view of Article III power over the Supreme Court and concludes that their
main concern was with standards for appellate review of lower court fact findings.
Because the problem of setting standards was so subtle and current practice so complex.
"it was concluded to leave the problem for handling by the Congress through the
medium of the 'exceptions' clause." Id. at 289. Berger concludes that history supports
Professor Hart's view of the power to make exceptions to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
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scholarly debate; the busing bills do more than even McCardle permits
under Section 2 of Article III:
1. They remove completely the Court's jurisdiction to require
lower or state courts to enter certain kinds of desegregation orders; in
McCardle, Congress had removed only one method of seeking Supreme
Court review.
2. They shift the burden of deciding how to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment in the schools from the Court to Congress. To the extent
that this shift cuts across a scheme implicit in the Fourteenth Amend.
ment, Klein suggests that the busing bills cannot find support in Ar-
ticle III.
A court reconsidering Swann, then, cannot end its inquiry with a
nod to congressional power over jurisdiction. If Article III gives the
federal courts the power conclusively to interpret the Constitution,
it cannot at the same time give Congress the power to override the
courts by invoking the magic term "jurisdiction." Marbury v. Madi-
son rejected such a reading of the Article. Congressional power over
jurisdiction is subject "in whole not in part" to "other provi-
sions of the Constitution,"7 and the busing bills find constitutional
support in Article III only to the extent that they do not run afoul
of the Constitution's substantive guarantees3 0
II. The Fourteenth Amendment: Rights and Remedies
The Supreme Court has found the mandate for every school de-
segregation decision from Brown v. Board of Education77 through
Swann in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court, in deciding a second Swann, would look to it again.
In Section 1, the Amendment provides: "No state shall ...deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Though the federal courts have taken the lead in enforcing the Equal
Protection Clause in the schools, Section 5 of the Amendment ex-
pressly grants enforcement power to Congress: "Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article."78
75. Hart, supra note 51, at 1372.
76. Because he insists that busing is always just one remedy among many, Professor
Bork suggests that Article III may give Congress power to enact the busing bills. But
because he sees "no point in precipitating a possible constitutional crisis unnecessarIly,"
he suggests that Congress look elsewhere. Bork, supra note 15, at 8.
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. If the restrictions on federal court busing orders like those in the busing bills
were enacted as a separate measure, as a restriction on federal courts and not as part
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The "original understanding" of the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, if indeed its authors and their contemporaries shared
one, has been obscured by a century of interpretation and gloss.70
Two years after its 1868 ratification, the Supreme Court construed
the Equal Protection Clause narrowly.80 A decade later, in the Civil
Rights Cases,"' the Court held that congreisional power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Amendment extended only to developing remedies for
state action that, in the exclusive judgment of the Court, denied equal
protection or due process. The Court's original view of congressional
power under Section 5 outlived the restrictive application of Sec-
tion 1 announced in the Slaughterhouse Cases,8 2 and survived into
the era in which the Equal Protection Clause received its most ex-
pansive reading. Congress, too, stayed within the boundaries set by
the Court; the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, de-
pended for its constitutionality not upon the Fourteenth Amendment
but upon the commerce power.83 But the Court abandoned this re-
of an attack on segregation, they could draw constitutional support from the Four-
teenth Amendment only to the extent that busing itself constitutes a denial of equal
protection. Only the denial of equal protection-found or foreseen by Congress or the
Court-activates the enforcement clause of Section 5. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966). After Swann and its companion case McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S.
39 (1971), the Court could see no busing order in this light. In McDaniel, the Supreme
Court of Georgia had directed a lower court to enjoin the enforcement of a local board's
desegregation plan because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment "by treating stu-
dents differently because of their race." Barresi v. Browne, 226 Ga. 456, 459, 75 S.E.2d
649, 652 (1970). The Supreme Court summarily reversed in light of Swan: "in this
remedial process, steps will almost invariably require that students be assigned 'dif-
ferently because of their race.'" 402 U.S. at 41. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
no support for a restriction of federal busing orders enacted alone.
But the restrictions on busing do not purport to be remedies for any denial of equal
protection, and they were not enacted alone. They are only part of a comprehensive
national effort to achieve equal educational opportunity that "includes both traditional
remedies for desegregation and the authorization for a new infusion of funds into
poverty stricken schools; they aim only, as the President advised Congress, "to establish
reasonable national standards." Message at 2. As a part of such a legislative plan, the
busing restrictions can overcome the initial problems of legitimacy under the Fourteenth
Amendment outlined above.
79. For some attempts to dig it out, see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 142 (1970)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); I C. FAIRtAN, REco=smucror Aso REUNioN 1864-63 (1971),
ch. 20; Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Desegregation Decision, 69 HAitv.
L. REv. 1 (1955). Fairman suggests that the Amendment's real import never Was dear.
Notwithstanding the pronouncement that it had been thoroughly understood b)'
the voters, we know that in truth it had not been understood even by its framers.
A form of words had been made supreme law . . . . [T]hat Congress would take
little part in the unfolding of the amendment-that the Court would become the
agent for enforcing Section 1 . . . are among the surprising observations about the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Supra at 1300. Perhaps the only understanding that can safely be attributed to te
framers of the Amendment is the understanding "that it was a constitution they were
writing." Bickel, supra at 13.
80. Slaughterhouse Cases, 77 U.S. (10 Wal.) 273 (1870).
81. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also United States v. Harris, 106 US. 629 (1882); United
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
82. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 273 (1870).
83. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975(a)-(d), 2000(a)-2000(h.6) (1970). See Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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strictive reading of Section 5 during the civil rights era-partially in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,8 4 and then completely in Katzenbach
v. Morgan.sa
A. Morgan and Section 5
Congress edged toward a bold assertion of power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment when it turned to a similar source of
constitutional authority in the Voting Rights Act of 1965.80 The
Fifteenth Amendment declares in Section 1 that "the right of citi-
zens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude." Section 2 grants Congress enforcement power
in language virtually identical to that of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court found that
Congress, by virtue of Section 2, had "full remedial powers to ef-
fectuate the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination
in voting'' s7 and specifically rejected the argument that "the task
of fashioning specific remedies or of applying them to particular
localities must necessarily be left entirely to the courts."' 8  Those
portions of the Act before the Court, which permitted the Attorney
General to suspend a state's use of a voter registration test or de-
vice and to call in federal registrars on finding that less than 50%
of its voting age residents were registered to vote or voted in the
1964 election, fell within the scope of congressional power under
the Fifteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Warren applied the same
standard to congressional power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment that Marshall had applied to the Commerce Clause: "This
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the Constitution."80
The potential impact of the Court's proposition that the enforce-
ment clause of the Fifteenth Amendment and the Necessary and
Proper Clause mean the same thing (at least as against the reserved
84. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
85. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
86. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
87. 383 U.S. at 326.
88. 383 U.S. at 327. The Court dealt at some length with the prior and unsatisfactory
attempts to eliminate voting discrimination through case by case litigation and focused
the discussion of the Voting Rights Act chiefly on its remedial provisions. Id. at 323-37.
The case, unlike Morgan, says nothing about congressional power to define discriminatory
practices; it only cites cases invalidating a number of them. Id. at 311-12.
89. 383 U.S. at 327, quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196.
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power of the states) became evident during the same term when the
Court applied it to the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in Katzenbach v. Morgan. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights
Act, not at issue in the South Carolina case, enfranchised Puerto
Ricans in New York City by effectively overruling parts of the New
York election lawsY' It provided that no state could deny the right
to vote in any election to an individual solely because he was illiterate
in English if he had completed the sixth grade in an American flag
school where the language of instruction was other than English.
In upholding § 4(e) on two related grounds,"1 the Court effectively
overruled the interpretation of Section 5 announced in the Civil Rights
Cases and greatly expanded the scope of congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morgan suggests not only
that Congress has authority under Section 5 to define as well as remedy
denials of equal protection but also that the courts should defer
to congressional exercise of that authority. Congress "brought a spe-
cially informed legislative competence" to its "general appraisal of
literacy requirements for voting."92 "It is enough that we be able
to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the con-
flict as it did."
93
Morgan's language, nonetheless, is "shrouded in ambiguity."9 By
confining its holding and interpolating qualifications of reasonable-
ness into the deference doctrine, Morgan could be reconciled with
earlier interpretations of Section 5. But the Court seems to invite a
90. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 383 U.S. 641, 645 n.3 (1966). The New York Consti-
tution, art. II, § 1 (1938) made English literacy a prereuisite for voting. -§ 150 anid
168 of the New York election law implemented the provision by empowering the Board
of Regents to give literacy tests and permitting new voters to submit, in the alternatihe,
certain evidence of education. Persons educated in Puerto Rico could make ite alter-
native showing if their education had been "predominantly in the English langtage."
N.Y. Election Law §§ 150, 168 (McKinney 1964).
91. In the first branch of its holding, the Court argued that enfranchising a large
segment of the New York Puerto Rican community "will be helpful in gaining non-
discriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community."
348 U.S. at 652. The Court in this branch of its argument refused independently to
determine whether state laws suspended by 4(e) violated the equal protection clause;
nor did it require an express congressional finding to that effect.
The Court also suggested, in a second and less novel branch of the opinion, that
section 4(e) was constitutional if it reflected Congress' conclusion that the New York
English literacy requirement discriminated against the class of Puerto Ricans defined
by the Act. But still the Court refused to examine the nerits of Congrss' conclusion;
it was willing to let the congressional judgment control. The Court need only "perceive
a basis" for the congressional judgment that New York's English language literacy test
violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 655-56.
92. Id. at 655-56.
93. Id. at 653. For a general critique of the case, see Bickel, The Yoting Rights
Cases, 1966 S. CT. Rv. 79; see also Cox, Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion
of Human Rights, 80 HAv. L. REv. 91 (1966).
94. Burt, Miranda and Title 1I: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 S. CT. REv. 81, 83.
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bolder reading, and a court considering the Busing Acts in its re-
examination of Swann must reckon with Morgan's bolder proposi-
tions, in particular the doctrine of judicial deference to legislative
judgment.
1. If Morgan Falls
Morgan has its critics, 5 and they may be gaining ground. In the
eighteen-year-old vote case,00 Morgan's suggestion that Congress may
define the content of equal protection virtually without judicial scru-
tiny could command only four votes,97 and the composition of the
Court has changed since that 1970 decision. Some serious faults in
Morgan's argument and some reservations about its consequences
suggest that a Swann II case might decline to follow it.
The Court in Morgan rested its decision in part on the historical
judgment that the Fourteenth Amendment's authors intended Con-
gress to be its prime enforcer. Although evidence exists to support
such a -view, so does strong evidence to the contrary. 8 At the time
of the congressional debates on the Amendment, there "was every
reason for the supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment to look con-
fidently toward the judiciary."0 9 In fact, the Amendment's authors may
have pressed for a constitutional amendment principally because they
wished to give the Court a constitutional weapon with which to pro-
tect these fundamental rights from emasculation by future Con-
gresses.100 As a matter of historical interpretation, the Morgan Court
95. See, e.g., Bickel, supra note 93; Burt, supra note 94.
96. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
97. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, and White thought that Title III of the
Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973bb-1973bb-3 (1970), extending the vote In
federal and state elections to persons between eighteen and twenty.one years of age,
was a valid exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Justice Black joined them on separate grounds to uphold the Act with respect
to federal elections, but he-with the other four members of the Court-thought Congress
could not set the voting age in state elections.
98. The majority in Morgan collected and relied upon a number of authorities
suggesting an active role for Congress under Section 5. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 385
U.S. 641, 643 note 7 (1966). Professor Burt is hihly critical both of these authoritles and
the Court's use of them; he reaches a very different conclusion. Burt, supra note 91,
at 84-100.
99. Burt, supra note 94, at 95.
100. Professor Burt reaches this conclusion:
[I]t is against future Congresses that the amendment must be protected. No one in
these debates suggested that the amendment could not be trusted in the hands of
the judiciary. However soon this belief was to appear, it was not voiced then . . ..
If the central role in protecting the amendment from future depredations is neces-
sarily vested in the courts, and if that role was derived from an explicitly stated
mistrust of future Congresses, where then does one find that the essence of the
amendment was to enlarge the powers of Congress vis-a-vis the courts?
Id. at 93.
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may have read the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the wrong way.
But whatever the role of Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment was meant to be, the Court is on at least questionable
footing if it holds that Section 5 suspends, for the purposes of Four-
teenth Amendment legislation, the enduring principle of Marbury
v. Madison.' The Court, not the Congress, defines the limits of
congressional power under the Constitution. Morgan does suggest
that the Court will defer without further inquiry to a congression-
al judgment that a violation of equal protection has occurred or is
likely to occur. But the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in-
tended no such deference and no such change in the basic relation-
ship of the Court to Congress. 102 Only a state denial of equal pro-
tection could trigger the exercise of congressional power under Sec-
tion 5: "Congress' view that the pre-condition has been met should
be persuasive, but it cannot be decisive."'1 3 To the extent that Mor-
gan counsels "abdicating judicial review,"'1 4 both its wisdom and its
vitality are open to serious doubt.
In the absence of Morgan and its doctrine of deference to con-
gressional Fourteenth Amendment judgments, the busing bills must
be subjected to constitutional inquiry of the kind required by the
Civil Rights Cases;'0 5 the Court must make its own, independent
judgment as to whether the congressional remedies will actually
remedy in each particular case the denial of equal protection found
by the Court. The busing bills may still claim legitimacy under the
101. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
102. See Bickel, supra note 93. Professor Bickel concludes his discussion of the history
of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Nothing is clearer . . . than that its framers rejected the option of an open.ended
grant of power to meddle with conditions within the states so as to render them
equal in accordance with its own notions. Rather the framers chose to write an
amendment empowering Congress only to rectify inequalities put into effect by the
states. Hence the power of Congress comes into play only when the precondition
of a denial of equal protection of the laws by a state has been met. Congress' view
that the precondition has been met should be persuasive, but it cannot be decisive.
That is the history of the matter.
Id. at 97.
103. Id. at 97.
104. Id. at 98.
105. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See pp. 1559-60. The Court set out the nature of congressional
power under Section 5 in these terms:
The legislation which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general
legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such
as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the states may
adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making
or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the states may commit or take, and
which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from committing or taking.
109 U.S. at 13-14.
1563
The Yale Law Journal
Fourteenth Amendment. But without Morgan's doctrine of defer-
ence, the Court hearing Swann II cannot end its inquiry by noting
that the bills mandate certain remedies and prohibit others.
2. If Morgan Stands
Whatever broader constitutional problems Morgan may raise, it
would bind the Court deciding a second Swann case. With Mllorgan's
doctrine of deference to congressional judgment, the busing bills
stand on different and perhaps firmer constitutional footing, since a
principled application of Morgan's general rule would suggest that
the Court defer to this legislative judgment as well. Several com-
mentators have suggested such a use for Morgan,0l and Justice Har-
lan foresaw it in his dissent, when he warned that "Congress should
.. . be able as well to exercise its Section 5 'discretion' by enacting
statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process
decisions of this Court."'
07
Although Morgan's doctrine of judicial deference has strong im-
plications for the busing bills, the Swann II court could distinguish
it in a number of ways. The 1965 Voting Rights Act broke new
ground, extending both the definition of equal protection and the
remedies for its denial in an area the Court had not yet occupied.
The busing bills, on the other hand, cover matters first taken up in
Brown v. Board of Education'"8 and developed in a long line of cases
culminating, for the time being, with Swann. 1 9 What the Fourteenth
Amendment requires in the schools is clear, at least in principle.
"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."110 School
boards are "charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial
discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.""' To dis-
charge that duty, "school authorities should make every effort to
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." 2 The
received wisdom of the desegregation cases does not make the busing
bills perforce unconstitutional, but it does suggest that they are a
106. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 94, at 118-23; Cox, supra note 93.
107. 384 U.S. 659, 668. He was joined in dissent by Mr. Justice Stewart.
108. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
109. For a history of these cases, see Johnson, School Desegregation Problems in the
South: An Historical Perspective, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1157 (1970); Note, Schools, Busing,
and Desegregation: The Post-Swann Era, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1078 (1971).
110. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
111. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
112. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
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very different phenomenon, historically and perhaps constitutionally,
from Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act in effect suspended the en-
forcement of a New York law, and the Swan II Court could distinguish
-and at the same time confine-Morgan by holding that congres-
sional power under the Fourteenth Amendment is restricted to sus-
pending state laws." 3 Certainly the sections of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act considered in South Carolina v. Katzenbach did only that, and
so did the act considered in Oregon v. Mitchell, where four members
of the majority thought the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress
power to set the voting age at eighteen in both federal and state
elections." 4 At the very least, it is clear that these statutes were up-
held because they dealt with state action. The busing bills do not
operate upon state law or attempt to affect state action; they work
exclusively on the federal level and limit only federal courts.110
These distinguishing features of Morgan, although they affect
its value as direct precedent for the busing bills, do not destroy the
broader impact of its central doctrine. The Court should, in enforcing
equal protection guarantees, defer to the legislature's judgment. Re-
sponding to Justice Harlan's suggestion that the deference doctrine
cut both ways, the majority attempted to limit Morgan in the now
famous footnote 10:
Section 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discre-
tion in the other direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect
to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this
Court." We emphasize that Congress' power under Section 5 is
limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the
Amendment; Section 5 grants Congress no power to restrict,
abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an en-
actment authorizing the States to establish racially segregated
systems of education would not be-as required by Section 5-a
measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection clause since that clause
of its own force prohibits such state laws. n1'
In effect, Justice Brennan argued that Congress may, under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, strike at state action that the
113. The Court's opinion is susceptible of a much broader interpretation. Professor
Cox argues that Morgan provides Congress with the authority to regulate the franchise,
to eliminate de facto segregation, and to adopt-under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment-a comprehensive code of criminal procedure for the states.
Supra note 97, at 107-08.
114. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). See note 97 supra.
115. See note 53 supra.
116. 384 U.S. at 652 n.10.
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Court could not reach, but it could not legitimate state action that
otherwise violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reading Morgan with footnote 10 presents its own problems, most
of which arise from the difficulty-or impossibility-of deciding whether
a statute is a "restriction" or an "extension" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees. In new fields of Fourteenth Amendment law, the
difficulty may be insurmountable. In Morgan, for example, Section
4(e) "extends" the right of non-English speaking Puerto Ricans to
vote, but it arguably "restricts" the rights of English-speaking voters
not to have their votes diluted. Relaxing the footnote's limitation of
Morgan would remove this problem, and it would permit the Court
to give congressional judgments equal and conclusive weight whether
the Congress sought to expand or narrow the current scope of equal
protection. 117
But the majority's footnote may not mean that the Court will con-
sider legislation it likes an "expansion" and legislation it dislikes a
"restriction" of Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. It may mean
simply that the Court reserves the right to make a full-scale Marbury
review of Section 5 legislation that threatens well-established Four.
teenth Amendment doctrine, upholding the statute only if it is con-
sistent in the particular case with the court's view of the Con-
stitution's requirements. Certainly the Court's use of school de-
segregation as an example in footnote 10118 suggests such an inter-
pretation. In any event, the footnote stands, and the court recon-
sidering Swann in light of the busing bills must decide, under Mor-
gan, whether the bills extend or restrict established Fourteenth Amend.
ment rights. 119
The Court could avoid such a judgment, of course, by relaxing the
footnote's limitations, and two basic arguments suggest that Mor-
gan's deference rule should extend to cover restrictions of Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees. First, it may be contended, Congress is a
more competent institution than the Court for making certain kinds
of decisions about equal protection, and the Court therefore should
117. See Burt, supra note 94, at 115-18, for a more eloquent exposition of this argu.
ment. See also Cox, supra note 93, at 106 n.86. Professor Cox, in an article evidently
written before Swann, makes a similar argument in suggesting that Congress act to
solve the constitutional problems of remedying school desegregation by using its Section
5 authority. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN-
CINNATi L. REv. 199, 257-61 (1971).
118. See p. 1565.
119. "[With footnote 10], the Morgan opinion appears a tour de force. To regulate
activities that the Court wishes to reach under the Fourteenth Amendment, but cannot
itself justify regulating, the Court has enlisted congressional assistance. But the Court
will set the basic terms. Congress can only fill in the blanks." Burt, supra note 94, at 118.
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defer in all cases to the congressional judgment. Second, it may be
argued, the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment intended Con-
gress to play a major role in enforcing it, and the Court ought to defer
consistently to Congress for that reason. Should the Swan 1I Court
apply these arguments to the area of school desegregation and disre-
gard footnote 10 in considering the busing bills?
The first argument, going to institutional competence, draws sup-
port from two parts of Morgan. Justice Brennan noted that Congress
brought "a special competence" to the Voting Rights Act because
of each member's necessary familiarity with the process of getting
elected.120 He suggested too that Congress brought a "general compe-
tence," greater than a court's, to a range of Fourteenth Amendment
cases beyond those concerning voting rights because of its capacity
for sophisticated and detailed judgments. Congress, Justice Brennan's
argument suggests, can compromise conflicting principles in a way
that courts cannot, and it can calibrate both the scope and the nature
of its enforcement much more finely than a court.12
In the area of school desegregation, however, neither the "special"
nor the "general" congressional competence are strong enough to com-
pel deference. Congress has no "special" competence in the schools
area of the kind it has in the voting area. 22 Whatever advantages it
has over a Court in developing school desegregation policy are a func-
tion of the advantages of the legislative process and not a result of any
close contact with schools. The usual rules of statutory construction
take into account such inherent advantages, and no special rule is
needed to reflect them.
As to "general deference," Justice Brennan's reasoning in Morgan
120. 384 US. at 656.
121. Professor Burt suggests this "different, much firmer rationale" for Morgan:
[C]learly Congress is less burdened by the principled constraints under which courts
labor. Congress, using no principle but fiat by majority vote, could act, for example,
to permit Mrs. Murphy to turn away black lodgers so long as she lived with her
other lodgers in a house that could accommodate no more than four families.
Congress could easily conclude that in Mrs. Murphy's case, but not in others closely
analogous, the values involved in free choice of companions should predominate.
The Court would have much greater difficulty independently constructing an ex-
emption for Mrs. Murphy, no matter how important some such exemption might
be, in order to mediate the clashing principles and political pressures at stake. 'lihe
Mrs. Murphys of the country are more likely to find spokesmen in the legislature than
in the courts, and the Murphy voices or silences can be noted by the legislature,
which then is able to make a reliable decision about where it might be politic to
temper the application of proscription against private discrimination. In this context
-devising appropriate adjustment of directly conflicting principles-the legislative
mechanism is greatly superior to the courts.
Supra note 94, at 110, 112.
122. If any branch of government has become familiar with the problems of school
desegregation, in the way that congressmen become familiar with the electoral process,
it is the federal courts.
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and other cases123 implies that the Court need not and should not
defer to Congress in areas where both the Court and Congress can
make the judgments necessary to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Courts should defer not because Congress is more competent
than the courts but because Congress is competent to make certain
kinds of judgments requiring detailed factual inquiries, and courts
are not.124 Seventeen years of experience with desegregation deci-
sions support the proposition that this area is within judicial compe-
tence.
In passing the busing bills, 12  Congress would be balancing some
of the same factors that the Swann court instructed trial judges to
assess in fashioning a busing order, including the age of the children
involved, the distance travelled and the time spent on the bus, the
nature of the area and the hazards of the trip. 20 It might be argued
that the Court should acknowledge the congressional superiority at
the traditionally legislative task of "balancing" and defer to Con-
gress' judgment. But the Court in Swann spoke of a very different
kind of balancing than that achieved by the flat, nationwide formulae
of the busing bills: a case by case determination, based on local condi-
tions and local data. 12 7 For this kind of balancing, the courts, not
Congress, would seem to be the more competent institution.
So the Court considering Swann II need not relax the limits placed
by footnote 10 on Morgan because Congress is more competent in
school desegregation. Nor does the history of Section 5 require such
a relaxation. Where, as in the busing bills, Congress seeks to limit
current remedies for state denial of equal protection, the history of
the Amendment would seem to call for close scrutiny rather than
automatic deference. 2
8
B. Morgan and Congressional Power
Whether Morgan stands or falls, then, the busing bills would face
a serious constitutional test in Swann II. Without Morgan, the Court
123. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
124. Id. at 248.
125. See note 13 supra.
126. 402 U.S. at 29-31. The Court indicated that the task of balancing, although
complex, was within a court's competence: "Tlse reconciliation of competing values III
a desegregation case is, of course, a difficult task with many sensitive facets but funda.
mentally no more so than remedial measures courts of equity have traditionally em-
ployed." Id. at 31.
127. "In this area [remedial alteration of attendance zones], we must rely to a
large extent, as this Court has for more than sixteen years, on the informed judgment
of the district courts in the first instance and on courts of appeals."
"Conditions in different localities will vary so widely that no rigid rules can be laid
down to govern all situations." Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 402 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1971).
128. See pp. 1559-60, 1562-63.
1568
Vol. 81: 1542, 1972
The Nixon Busing Bills
must decide whether effective desegregation could be achieved within
the bill's limitations; if it could not, then the court would simply
have to ignore the bill pursuant to Marbury v. Madison.120 And with
Morgan, the court-because of the majority's footnote-faces much
the same question: Do the busing bills "extend" or "restrict" the
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment?
But the Supreme Court in Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg effec-
tively determined how the Court in a hypothetical Swann 11 would
characterize the remedy limited by the busing bills under either
regime. Busing, one remedy among many, becomes a right when it
is the only way in which a district court can achieve the "greatest
possible degree of actual desegregation." 30 With or without Morgan
to support them, the busing bills go too far in restricting a child's
right to attend schools in a desegregated district.
District courts have used or considered a number of methods in
desegregating the public schools. Courts have redrawn school at-
tendance zones to make them more compact and more balanced; they
have gerrymandered zones, making them less compact but more
balanced; they have paired a substantially white school with a sub-
stantially black school, ordering half of the grades held at one school
and the rest at the other school. Courts have also approved desegrega-
tion plans that call for closing older schools in racially impacted
neighborhoods and building new schools in areas accessible to both
races. Some school boards have implemented plans that call for the
construction of central, magnet schools and "educational parks."'
01
Swann mentions most of these methods, 32 and the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities Bill incorporates them into its schedule of
remedies. 133
But the Bill obscures what Swann expressly recognizes. Each of
these methods of desegregation may, depending upon the racial
demography of the school district involved, require that students be
bused to their new schools.' 34 In Swann, the Court dealt with a
school district of 60,000 white students and 24,000 black students;
14,000 of the blacks attended schools that were 99% black. In order
to spread the black students, most of whom lived in the central city,
129. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
130. 402 U.S. at 26.
131. For a full discussion of these remedies and cases of each. see Notc. Schools,
Busing and Desegregation: The Post-Swann Era, 46 N.Y.U.L. RE,. 1078 (1971); Comment,
Busing, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, and the Future of Desegregation in the Fifth
Circuit, 49 Tzx. L. Rlv. 884 (1971).
132. 402 U.S. at 22-31.
133. § 402; see note 11 supra.
134. 402 US. 1 at 29-31.
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over a district of 550 square miles the district court gerrymandered
school attendance zones, created "satellite zones"' 35 and paired in-
ner-city schools with one or more white schools. The district court
had specifically rejected an alternative plan that used only gerry.
mandering to desegregate elementary schools. Instead, it grouped
nine inner-city schools with twenty-four suburban schools. 130 The
district court's plan, no matter what name is given to the techniques
it used, required more busing-the school district would have to pur-
chase 138 more buses, the court found, to implement the plan.137
Under Swann's standard, in large school districts like Charlotte-
Mecklenburg the alternatives are simple: transport students or con-
tinue to have a substantial number of racially identifiable schools.
The busing bills' insistence that there are "other remedies" cannot
alter that fact. Busing and desegregation are questions of degree;
even Swann set as its goal a "degree" of desegregation. Nor, as Swan
recognized, is desegregation synonymous with racial balance. But
precisely because desegregation is a question of degree, a point comes
when the failure to move further toward racial balance becomes a
failure to desegregate. And if moving further means more busing,
then the Equal Protection Clause requires, as it did in Swann, more
busing.13
8
The Swann Court expressly considered and approved of the dis-
trict court's finding that "assignment of children to the school near-
est their home serving their grade would not produce an effective
135. In "satellite zoning," students from a central city zone attend school with students
from an outlying zone.
136. These data are taken from the Court's discussion, 402 U.S. at 6-11.
137. Id. at 30, n.12.
138. Professor Bork, although he strongly defends most of the busing bills, is willing
to say only that a "good case" can be made for the constitutionality of the restrictions
on busing elementary school children. Bork, supra note 15, at 21-22. This feature-§ 403(a)
of the Equal Educational Opportunities Bill-is of course the crux of the busing plan.
Professor Bork devotes a bit more than a page to its defense, and lie hinges his argu.
ment on the assertion that there "are many remedies other than busing available to
courts .... Id. at 22. He might argue in the same vein that Swann was not a "con-
stitutional decision," since it dealt with remedies and not rights. Because busing Is one
remedy among many, Bork argues, the Equal Educational Opportunities Bill leaves Intact
the duty Brown imposed upon formerly segregated school districts. Such an argument
creates an artificial distinction between rights and remedies: the right which cannot be
vindicated is not a right at all, and the most that can be said for the distinction Is that
it may be useful where a right can be vindicated in several ways. Professor Bork's
right-remedy distinction simply assumes the answer to the central question. If busing
is in some cases-as it was in Swann-the only remedy that would produce desegregationt
in any real sense, then Professor Bork's argument falls. The real question about the
constitutionality of the busing bills is the question that Bork hesitates to answer d-
rectly: to what extent does the Equal Protection Clause require that once segregated
schools achieve a racial balance? Swann, of course, had a simple and direct answer: to
the greatest extent possible.
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dismantling of the dual system... ."130 In a companion case to Swan,
North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann 40 the Court struck
down a North Carolina anti-busing statute, citing the principal Swann
case and explaining that "bus transportation has long been an inte-
gral part of all public educational systems, and it is unlikely that a
truly effective remedy could be devised without continued reliance
on it." 1 41 A retreat from Swann's strong rule, before the busing bills
or some other indication of congressional displeasure, is always pos-
sible. Congress, as a coequal branch, has a role to play in the process
of constitutional adjudication, and its opinions should command the
Court's serious consideration.1 42 But under Swann, busing is one
truly effective remedy-and in Swann the only such remedy-for the
denial of equal-protection in the schools.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, then, structures but does
not determine the outcome of the court's inquiry into the busing bills
in Swann II. Reading Section 5 without Morgan, the Court should
uphold the bills only if, in the district before the court, the substantive
mandate of the Amendment can be carried out within the limits set by
the bills. Swann and its companions suggest that there will be some
districts-including Charlotte-Mecklenburg-where it cannot. If the
Court applies Morgan's reading of Section 5, the bills are on stronger
ground because of the doctrine of judicial deference to congressional
judgment in the enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the
Morgan Court, whatever it yielded of the territory gained in Marbury
v. Madison, reserved a question that the Swann H Court must answer
before it may even apply the deference doctrine: Does the measure con-
stitute an extension or a restriction of Fourteenth Amendment guar-
antees? Swann and its companions suggest that the busing bills restrict
the rights of children in some districts to attend desegregated schools.
139. 402 U.S. 1 at So.
140. 402 US. 42 (1971).
141. Id. at 46. The statute, N.C. G&,. STAT. § 115.176.1 (Supp. 1971) read in part:
No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on account of race,
creed, color or national origin, or for the purpose of creating a balance or ratio
of race, religion or national origins. Involuntary busing of students in contravention
of this article is prohibited, and public funds shall not be used for any such busing.
142. "The Court may defer to the judgment of a co-equal branch of govcmmet
even when it believes that it need not. Or the justices may be persuaded to a different
view of a subject by the informed opinion of the legislature. At the very least, a de-
liberate judgment by Congress on constitutional matters is a powerful brief laid before
the Court. A constitutional role of even such limited dimensions is not to be despised.
It has the virtue of persuading Congress to play a fuller and more active role in con-
stitutional questions without the inhibiting thought that every such occasion must pro-
voke a confrontation between two great branches of govemment." Bork, supra note 15, at
5-6.
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To the extent this is so in such districts, the bills are beyond Congress'
power under Section 5. Whether Morgan stands or falls, the Court in
Swann II must make the crucial constitutional judgments about the
busing bills in terms of the desegregation decisions and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not in terms of Section 5.
Conclusion
A court trying to reconcile Swann's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment with the Busing Acts will find no easy escape from
facing again and deciding again Brown's unresolved question: To
what lengths must a once segregated school district go in order to
eliminate racial segregation "root and branch?" Article III of the
Constitution gives Congress power to create inferior courts and
regulate the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but leaves
with the Court the ultimate responsibility for deciding what the
Fourteenth Amendment requires. The most sweeping assertions of
congressional power under Article III have been accepted by the
Court only because they could be cast as congressional choices of
remedy. Congress may choose among remedies by regulating juris-
diction as it wishes, but "jurisdiction always is jurisdiction only to
decide constitutionally."' 143 Whatever power over remedies Article
III gives Congress, it is a power to grant or withhold particular reme-
dies, not constitutional rights.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, with or without Mor-
gan's doctrine of judicial deference to congressional judgment, grants
Congress no greater power than Article III. Congress under Section
5 may mandate certain remedies and combinations of remedies, but
the Court deciding Swann II must still decide, in Hart's phrase, "con-
stitutionally." It must determine whether the denial of equal pro-
tection can be remedied within the limits of the congressional plan.
Without Morgan, the question may be cast differently, but it will
be answered the same way. As Chief Justice Burger wrote recently,
"Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual states
to violate the Equal Protection Clause." 144 Congress may enact reme-
dies; it cannot, even under Morgan, abrogate rights.
Swann suggests that busing has become a right in large and demo-
graphically complex school districts because the last vestiges of segrega-
143. Hart, supra note 59, at 1402.
144. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 382 (1971).
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tion can be removed in no other way. But the busing remedy remains
a constitutional right-even in such districts-only as long as the Court
adheres to the principle that "separate educational facilities are in-
herently unequal."'145 The Nixon busing bills, like any bill restrict-
ing a court's power to order busing, challenge that principle. The
Court may think Brown's central proposition wrong, or at least too
simplistic in an age of growing sophistication about education. But
the Court, if so inclined, must make that judgment explicit, for tie
busing bills affect rights, not remedies, and they challenge both
Brown and Swann.
145. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 US. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added).
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